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Behavioral Economics

Prof. Dr. Yves Breitmoser

© Universität Bielefeld

Publikationen

  • Breitmoser, Y. (2020). Controlling for presentation effects in choice. Quantitative Economics (forthcoming).
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2020). An axiomatic foundation of conditional logit. Economic Theory, DOI:
    10.1007/s00199-020-01281-1.
  • Breitmoser, Y. and Tan, J.H.W. (2020). Why should majority voting be unfair? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 175: 281–295.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2019). Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions.
    Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 423–447.
  • Tan, J.H.W., Breitmoser, Y., and Bolle, F. (2015). Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent. Games and Economic Behavior, 92: 106–121.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2015). Cooperation, but no reciprocity: Individual strategies in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. American Economic Review, 105(9): 2882–2910.
  • Breitmoser, Y., Tan, J.H.W., and Zizzo, D.J. (2014). On the Beliefs off the Path: Equilibrium Refinement due to Quantal Response and Level-k. Games and Economic Behavior, 86: 102–125.
  • Breitmoser, Y. and Vorjohann, P. (2013). Efficient structure of noisy communication networks. Mathematical Social Sciences, 66(3): 396–409.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2013). Estimating social preferences in generalized dictator games. Economics Letters, 121(2): 192–197.
  • Breitmoser, Y. and Tan, J.H.W. (2013). Reference dependent altruism in demand bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 92(1): 127–140.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2013). Increasing marginal costs are strategically beneficial in forward trading. Economics Letters, 119: 109–112.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2012). Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 75: 555–569.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2012). Proto-coalition bargaining and the core. Economic Theory, 51(3): 581–599.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2012). On the endogeneity of Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg competition in oligopolies. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30: 16–29.
  • Bolle, F., Breitmoser, Y., Heimel, J., and Vogel, C. (2012). Multiple motives of pro-social behavior: Evidence from the solidarity game. Theory and Decision, 72(3): 303–321.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2011). Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members. Social Choice and Welfare, 37(1):149–169.
  • Bolle, F. and Breitmoser, Y. (2011). Transaction Costs and Capacity Costs as Interrelated Determinants of Vertical Integration in Oligopolies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 167(2): 266–290.
  • Bolle, F., Breitmoser, Y. and Schlächter, S. (2011). Extortion in the laboratory. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 78(3): 207-218.
  • Breitmoser, Y., Tan, J.H.W., and Zizzo, D.J. (2010). Understanding Perpetual R&D Races. Economic Theory, 44(3): 445-467.
  • Bolle, F., and Breitmoser, Y. (2009). The Strategic Use of Secrets: Doubts about a Proposal of Schelling. Homo Oeconomicus, 26(1): 79-96.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2009). Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way. International Journal of Game Theory, 38(2): 183-191.
  • Bolle, F. and Breitmoser, Y. (2008). Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power. In: Power, Freedom, and Voting. Matthew Braham and Frank Steffen (Eds.). Heidelberg: Springer. Chap. 10, 185-208.
  • Breitmoser, Y. (2005). Infinitely repeated games of reciprocal players. Economics Letters, 89(3): 323–327.
  • Bolle, F. and Breitmoser, Y. (2001). Spectrum auctions: How they should and how they should not be shaped. FinanzArchiv, 58(3): 260–285.
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